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Abstract 
 
This article examines some of the reasons why banks and insurance 
companies have been accused of discrimination, and shows that 
this is by and large a false accusation. Economic analysis 
demonstrates that racial discrimination is not a profit maximizing 
strategy. Actually, unwise public policies are actually precluding 
many consumers from the market. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Insurance companies and banks are frequently accused of racial 
discrimination. This accusation is often brought about by the fact 
that minorities frequently have higher insurance rates and receive 
fewer loans. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the 
theory of discrimination in the economics literature (for examples 
see Arrow 1972a, 1972b; Becker 1971; Block 1992; Phelps 1972; 
and Stigler 1971) as well as to empirical studies of discrimination 
in the insurance and banking industries (for examples see Angel et 
al 2005; Benston 1999; Berkovic et al 1992; Black 1997; Black et 
al 1997, 2001; Buzzacchi and Valletti 2005; Calomiris et al 1994; 
Coate and Loury 1993; Evans et al 1985; Ferguson and Peters 
1995, 1997; Holmes and Horvitz 1994; Horne 1997; Kerwin and 
Hurst 2002; Longhofer and Peters 1999; Muth 1979; Ross and 
Yinger 2002; Tootell 1993; Randall 1995; and Yezer et al 1994). 
While discrimination has been an issue in both industries for quite 
sometime a study done by the Boston Fed in 1992 concluded that 
there was indeed systematic discrimination in the mortgage-lending 
market. Despite many studies that followed (For examples see 
Bostic 1996; Browne and Tootell 1995; Day and Liebowitz 1998; 
Harrison 1998; and Munnell et al 1996), some attacking the Feds 
findings and some defending them, the study was all the legislators 
needed to move into action (Liebowitz 2008). One answer to 
eliminating this discrimination comes in the common proposal for 
the government to intervene and impose mandatory insurance and 
lending schemes (Wray 1995; Appelbaum 2008; Jagger 2007).  
Since the Boston Fed study came out many states have enacted 
laws imposing controls on both the banking and insurance industry. 
There was even a manual for mortgage lenders.  
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 Regulation, however, may not be the best answer. 
Regulation often has unintended consequences that exacerbate the 
problems they are intended to solve. An alternative way to reduce 
or eliminate discrimination is through competition. Through 
competition we can see that discrimination would not last long in a 
free market.1 Market forces would make sure that those who 
choose to engage in discrimination would bare the costs of doing 
so. This shows that it is something other than racial discrimination 
that is the cause of the differences in rates. In this paper we will 
present the conditions under which discrimination is not likely in 
the insurance and banking industries and then show why regulation 
is the wrong path for alleviating the differences in price for 
minorities. The same regulations that are meant to help actually 
end up doing more damage.  
 
Section 2 examines the theory why discrimination is not 
sustainable under the assumption that companies are profit driven 
in the insurance industry. Section 3 does the same but in regards to 
the banking industry. Section 4 discusses the consequences of 
government intervention in banking and insurance. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2 The Case of Insurance Companies    
 
Many urban consumers pay higher insurance premiums than 
consumers. A few possible explanations exist, but one common 
hypothesis is that insurance companies engage in racial 
                                                 
1 As we will discuss competition provides incentives for companies to not act in 
discriminatory ways. Economics recognizes that taste-based discrimination on 
the part of consumers, however, is a different matter. Since people do not claim 
that taste-based discrimination on the part of consumers in the banking and 
insurance market a problem, we will not address it in this paper. 
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discrimination.2 A company engaging in racial discrimination 
could be motivated out of malevolence or they could view it as a 
way to increase profits.3 If insurance companies, for example, 
would exploit minorities into paying higher premiums they could 
earn higher earnings in the long run. Let us assume, that insurance 
companies do indeed want to earn as much from urban consumers 
and have no problem discriminating based on race. While most 
people assume that government regulation is necessary, they 
overlook a totally different solution: competition. Unlike regulation 
and other interventions into the market, competition provides 
important incentives to reduce or even eliminate racial 
discrimination.4 
 
Consider what would happen in an insurance market where 
urban minorities are exploited. Take a hypothetical, but plausible, 
example. Let us say home insurance has a market rate of $2,000, 
but urban minorities are purposely overcharged. Just because of 
their demographics, they have to pay $3,000. By simply 
discriminating these insurance companies have enabled themselves 
to make an extra $1000 profit on every minority they insure.  
 
   But is this really sustainable? The outcome depends on 
what types of insurers exist. If any insurers are motivated by profits 
over race, they would try to insure as many minorities as possible.5 
The more minorities the profit motivated companies signed up, the 
                                                 
2 Calls of discrimination in the insurance industry come from many different 
sources. From politicians (Kagen 2008) to news reports (Kurkjiian 1995a, 
1995b; Sherman 2008; Ruiz 2008) to scholarly papers (Squire 1997).  
3 See for examples Block 1992 and Liebowitz 2008.  
4 See Alchian and Kessel 1962; Becker 1971; Benston 1999; Block 1992; and 
Cymrot 1985.  
5 But if they could really get away with this why would they only charge the 
higher price to minorities? Insurers would truly want to charge as many people 
this price regardless of whether they are a minority or not. If a company is profit 
driven this should seriously call into question what is really going on.  
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higher their profits. No profit maximizing company would pass up 
the opportunity to make so much extra money. Indeed, why would 
the company bother with non-minorities at all? With so many 
profitable minorities to insure, non-minorities would be shown the 
door.  
 
   In reality, however, this situation cannot last for long. Other 
companies alert to profit opportunities would catch on and 
undercut their competitors by offering insurance for slightly less.6 
This would attract further business from the minority community, 
so instead of making $1000 profit on a handful of downtrodden, it 
could make say $900 profit on hoards of people. The latter position 
would yield enormous profits. Would this be the final outcome? 
Would minorities now be exploited, only this time to the tune of 
$2900 at the hands of the new competitor?  
 
   The answer is no. Retaliation would ensue and others 
would charge less, to increase profits in the same fashion. In this 
case companies charging $2900 would lose customers or be forced 
to lower their price as well. This process would continue until the 
price paid by the customer roughly equaled the marginal cost to the 
company, $2000. With competition, no firm would be able to 
exploit minorities by charging them $3000 for $2000 insurance. In 
the long run, if the price of the insurance to a customer stays at 
$3000 that must be its market value.7  
 
                                                 
6 This does assume free entry into the market, and when there is no free entry 
these results do not hold. An example of large scale discrimination occurring due 
to lack of free entry was found in the American South in the early 20
th
 century 
with the Jim Crow laws. Roback (1986), however, shows that much of the 
segregation was a result of state intervention, not the free market. This was also 
more recently shown by Bartlett (2008). 
7 Operationally the long run would refer to the point when others become aware 
of profit opportunities. With all of today‟s technology, this time frame is 
becoming shorter and shorter. 
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   A competitive system provides incentives for profit 
maximizing firms to serve minorities. But what if companies are 
motivated by something besides profits, such as the desire to 
advance racial discrimination? A situation with racially motivated 
companies‟ sounds dour, but for racial discrimination to be the 
long run equilibrium this motivation must be industry wide.8 
Otherwise the businesses are driven by profits will under cut the 
businesses driven by discrimination and the latter would find it 
difficult to sustain the costs associated with the racial hatred.  
 
   Harrington and Niehaus (1998) have found the evidence of 
discrimination to be lacking and one study found that many reports 
that claim discrimination are using bad or incorrect data (Harrison 
1998). So why do disparities between insurance rates persist in 
absence of laws forcing them to conform? Simple: many insurable 
risks are higher in the inner city where a proportionately higher 
number of minorities live. Through no fault of their own, city 
dwellers are often faced with higher rates of crimes against their 
property.9  
 
    If property is more often the target of burglary, the inner city 
insurance customer would need to be reimbursed more often than 
his suburban counterpart and this translates into higher premiums. 
It is completely unrelated to racial discrimination (Williams, 1982, 
19). All of the additional costs to the insurance company require 
higher premiums if bankruptcy is not to ensue. The fact that city 
residents face a higher risk of infringements on their property is 
unfortunate, but insurance companies set their rates based on 
                                                 
8 One of the more discriminatory environments in recent history was in the 
American South in the early 20
th
 Century, but it also must be recognized that 
much of the discrimination was enforced by government laws rather than the 
market. See for example, Roback (1984, 1986) and Bartlett (2008). 
9 There is no evidence that lenders discriminate by accepting only the most 
qualified black applicants and marginally qualified whites (Benston 1999). In 
fact, Berkovic et al. (1992) find just the opposite.  
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actuarial tables not personal worldviews.10 If they did it would 
create profit opportunities for companies that were more sensible.  
 
 Let us consider a related example. Owners of housing in 
flood plains are also faced with the unfortunate problem with 
owning property more likely to be damaged through no fault of 
their own. But just because the risk of property damage is not their 
fault, does not mean they should expect to pay the same insurance 
premiums as people whose property is less likely to be damaged. 
The property with higher risks will have higher premiums, even 
though no discrimination is operating here. If discrimination were 
to surface, it would get penalized by the market process. 
 
 Yet some people argue it is unfair that people should be 
penalized merely for living in a high-crime neighborhood. The 
theory is that they have a hard enough time as it is. Insurers should 
not add to the burden by tacking on penalties for poor living 
conditions that residents would change if they could. For this 
reason many state governments, most famously Massachusetts, 
have set maximum price ceilings on insurance premiums.  
 
Is government intervention in the insurance market the 
most effective way to benefit the downtrodden? Unfortunately 
government interference with insurance rates has the unintended 
consequence of preventing many people from finding insurance. 
First let us consider the theory and then let us consider the 
evidence. Suppose an insurance company is legally forbidden from 
charging anything above the going rate for insurance in the 
suburbs, $2,000. What customers will insurers tend to want to 
insure? With a price ceiling imposed, the insurance corporations 
will do everything they can to not insure any inner city residents. 
                                                 
10 It is true that actuary tables can be calculated in number of different ways, 
including with racial or other prejudicial attitudes. If, however, a company does 
this it will bare the costs of doing so. A profit maximizing company would not 
factor irrelevant racial variables into their actuarial analysis.  
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The inner city residents will be discriminated against in a real 
sense, but in this sense the problem is not inherent in the market, 
the problem stems from the price controls. The companies are not 
being racist; they are simply responding to perverse incentives 
created by bad policies. In this example, the government has 
moved us from a situation where there had been no shortage of 
insurance for people in the inner city to one where it is virtually 
unavailable.  
 
Another tactic is to impose anti-discrimination law that 
imposes penalties if government notices any systematic disparities 
in the pricing structure for insurance between racial groups. The 
company will still face the reality that risk pools are not equal for 
all people. The companies have to be more subtle about it, but they 
will do what they can to avoid high-risk areas. In this way, anti-
discrimination law works like a price control. It distorts the 
availability of insurance, raises premiums for everyone, restricts 
innovation, and dampens competitive bidding among suppliers. 
 
 Nowhere is this more obvious than in auto insurance, where 
states like Massachusetts and New Jersey both mandate insurance 
and have numerous policies to prohibit discrimination. The result, 
however, has been a financial disaster for consumers. As Kurkjiian 
(1995a) reports, “Massachusetts is one of few states that prohibits 
[allowing insurance companies to write policies that insure homes 
at their fair market value, instead of their replacement cost], and 
the financial impact is particularly tough in poorer 
neighborhoods".11 A more recent study on health insurance, 
another area that tends to be heavily regulated, found that the poor 
are much less likely to be covered (Angel et al. (2005). Still the 
                                                 
11 In Massachusetts auto insurance has been deregulated in certain ways in 
recent years (Mohl 2007) but it still remains highly regulated and it has the 4
th
 
highest rates in the country (Mohl 2006). In other industries such as with 
mortgages, the number of regulations in Massachusetts are going up (Appelbaum 
2008). 
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unwillingness of the insurance industry to provide coverage to 
inner city residents is unlikely to stem inherent racism. Even if a 
significant percentage of providers seek to engage in racial 
discrimination, as long as they face competition, the companies 
engaging in racial discrimination will lose out. The companies 
wishing to engage in long term discrimination would be at a 
significant disadvantage compared to competitors who care not 
about race, but about serving as many customers as possible. So 
even an industry is not free from individual racists (it is possible 
some acted out of racial discrimination) the market in the aggregate 
can still be free of racial discrimination.12 The lack of coverage for 
many urban residents stems from the fact that insurance companies 
are unable to charge prices that cover the costs involved - let alone 
prices that allow for profit. 
 
3 The Case of Banking and Loans 
 
Similar problems exist with bank lending to urban minorities. 
Many people believe that banks make their decisions based on race 
rather than profits and that the government must step in. If all 
demographics had the same credentials and banks bypassed 
minority borrowers there would be a clear case of unfair 
discrimination.13 Let us say that most banks are guilty of such 
prejudice and are unaware about the good risks that certain 
demographics present.  
 
           But even if we start in such an unfortunate situation, 
competition provides incentives to weed such behavior out. If a 
group of minorities, for example, could not receive loans because 
                                                 
12 Harrison‟s (1998) research indicates that there is no significant evidence of 
racial discrimination in mortgage markets. See also Day and Liebowitz 1998; 
and Benston 1999.  
13 See for examples Berkovic et al 1992; Bostic 1996; Black 1997; Black et al 
1997, 2001; Blanton 2007; Browne and Tootell 1995; Jagger 2007; and Tootell 
1993. 
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of unfair discrimination, they would do whatever possible to 
receive a loan. Such individuals would be willing to pay higher 
than market interest rates. With a large group of otherwise 
qualified people willing to pay higher rates, any bank would be 
foolish not to lend to this group. But even if the vast majority of 
banks willfully ignored a group of qualified customers solely 
because of their race, all it takes is one bank to step in to mitigate 
the problem. The first bank to notice the situation could enhance 
profits by charging these qualified people higher rates. The bank 
could be run by members of that demographic group or simply be 
run by one entrepreneur who cares more about profits than about 
discrimination. 
 
           The company that discovers this market opportunity would 
earn above normal profits by catering to minorities and 
discriminating against non-minorities. The success of this one 
company would attract even more capital if that bank persistently 
earned above normal returns. And this is not the end of the story. 
As in the insurance example above, any banks engaging in racial 
discrimination would be faced with the choice. They could 
continue to discriminate unfairly, but to do so would mean lower 
profits and a continued loss in market share. As long as a market 
has open entry, non-racist entrants would be free to come in and 
compete with the firm earning extra profits by serving minorities. 
Even if many people would forgo profits to engage in 
discrimination as long as there is enough competition, profits in the 
long run will be pushed towards their normal rate (Block 1992, 
19). This process can continue until the point where these qualified 
minorities would be paying the same rates as their non-minority 
counterparts. Even if many bankers were inherently racist, 
competition provides important incentives for them to not act in a 
racist manner and instead compete and undercut each other's prices 
in order to attract profitable customers. As Benston (1999) notes, 
“Competition and just good business sense have been effective in 
encouraging, most, if not all, banks to offer loans to credit worthy 
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mortgagors without regard to their race, gender, or other irrelevant 
personal attributes.”   
 
Eventually others would catch on and lending rates to the 
two groups would be the same, all else equal. In the current world 
all else is not always equal, so not only do interest and lending 
rates differ from person to person, the averages between 
demographic groups differ. Certain demographic groups do in fact 
receive a disproportionately lower percentage of loans, so this 
leads many policymakers to declare that disparities between 
groupings such as race are evidence for discrimination on the part 
of bankers. But alternative explanation is that differences emerge 
not because of personal preferences of bankers but because 
applicants have differences in income, credit ratings, default risk, 
and assets. Because each individual is different we should not 
everyone to have the same rate and we should not expect to see 
averages across groups to always be the same.  
 
Interestingly, when looking at the data, adjusted for all 
these factors, we find that some minority groups actually receive a 
higher proportion of loans than their credit would suggest. Jacoby 
(1995) reports, Federal Reserve economists tracked 220,000 
federally insured loans and discovered "a higher likelihood of 
default on the part of black borrowers compared with white 
households."14 This finding brings doubt to the hypothesis that 
current lenders discriminate against minorities. If banks were 
indeed rejecting qualified minorities, then the minorities who did 
receive loans must have been extra-qualified and would have lower 
default rates.15 
 
                                                 
14 See also Berkovic et al. (1992) and Benston (1999).  
15 Black (1997) also finds that African American applicants are more often 
denied loans by African American owned banks than non African American 
owned banks. This evidence suggests that something other than race is driving 
the differences in rates. 
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 The difference in default rate can in all likelihood be 
explained by the anti-discrimination laws. Without the law, 
borrowers would ceteris paribus be given loans based on their 
credit risk. But with the laws, banks have to go out of their way to 
lend to borrowers of certain demographics even if they are more 
likely to default.  
 
One can find evidence for or against the discrimination 
hypothesis by looking at how minority owned banks treat minority 
customers. Studies by Black, Collins, and Cyree (1997) and Ross 
and Yinger (2002) show that minority owned banks do get a higher 
proportion of minority applicants, but white owned banks do not 
have a higher denial rate then the minority owned banks. If 
anything minority owned banks have a slightly higher denial rate 
due to the regulations imposed on white owned banks (Benston 
1997).  
 
Because of the regulations banks have to take numerous 
steps to make sure they are not accused of discrimination. 
Regulators need only reason to believe that discrimination has 
taken place before fining banks, blocking mergers, or stopping 
other kinds of regulatory applications that banks may be working 
on. Sadly this story is all too much a reality.  
 
Recently Liebowitz (2008) has shown that government 
directives made lenders such as Countrywide to be less diligent 
with their loan. Since then the market has fallen into a sub-prime 
lending crisis and many of the companies have fallen into 
bankruptcy. By trying to avoid charges of discrimination, many bad 
loans were made and in the end it has had important negative 
repurcusions in the industry. As Liebowitz and Day (1998) 
predicted ten years ago before, “After the warm and fuzzy glow of 
„flexible underwriting standards‟ has worn off, we may discover 
that they are nothing more than standards that lead to bad 
loans…these policies will have done a disservice to the punitive 
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beneficiaries if…they are disposed from their homes.” To avoid 
charges of discrimination, banks were essentially forced to do 
things that would not occur in the market.       
 
The fear of discrimination charges comes in many different 
forms. Regulators look for three types of alleged misdeeds: "blatant 
discrimination," “differential treatment discrimination," or 
"adverse impact discrimination." The burden of proof is generally 
on the accused. This ends up diverting credit from its highest 
valued uses toward ends determined by politics and pressure 
groups. 
 
What about redlining? With deregulation and advances in 
banking, neighborhood based banking is in decline, but still there 
are claims that banks red line certain areas out of the lending 
market, a charge which banks have denied for decades (Benston 
1999). Here too the logic and the effects of competition will be 
similar. Even if certain banks did indeed engage in conspicuous 
redlining, under a system of competition there will be few negative 
affects. If anything, conspicuous redlining would alert competitors 
that a bank is writing off whole sections of the city where there 
might be profits to be had.  
 
           Again, even if bankers were inherently discriminatory, 
unless they would be willing to forgo profits, their lending criterion 
will expected monetary returns. In the current world, it is true that 
certain neighborhoods residents are less likely to have a home loan. 
But this may have nothing to do with racial discrimination and 
more to do with the fact that each neighborhood has different 
demographics and some demographics are more likely to demand 
or have the qualifications necessary to receive loans.16 A college 
neighborhood consisting of rental housing, for example, would 
                                                 
16 Research by Charles and Hurst (2002) suggests that African Americans are 
less likely to be homeowners due to the fact that they apply for mortgages less 
often.  
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have fewer good candidates for home mortgage loans. If a lender 
finds few qualified borrowers in that neighborhood he may take his 
business elsewhere. Race would have nothing to do with it. 
Lenders look at a potential borrower‟s income, outstanding debt, 
and credit rating and of course these factors differ from person to 
person.  
 
4 Problems with Government Intervention 
 
To determine whether redlining and other forms of discrimination 
should be prohibited requires deciding whether loan decisions 
should be made by people putting their money on the line or by 
political agents. Should lending institutions be compelled to make 
loans against their better judgment? According to many, the answer 
is yes. For example, the number of hurdles that Fleet Financial 
Group had to pass when it purchased Shawmut National 
Corporation demonstrates this well. Unless the newly formed 
company promised to make large amounts of loans to the 
disadvantaged, Massachusetts regulators would not approve the 
merger. As Reidy (1995) detailed, "[The most recent commitment] 
bring to more than $600 million Fleet's commitments in recent 
months to affordable housing, mortgages, and small business loans. 
The programs, analysts said, are part of Fleet's efforts to mute 
opposition from community groups and state agencies as it seeks 
the approval of federal regulators to purchase Shawmut."17 
Eventually the merger was approved but the politicians imposed 
significant costs. This is just one of the many examples of how 
financial decisions have become more and more influenced by the 
political process.  
 
         The insurance market faces its share of government 
involvement as well. As principles of economics demonstrates, 
                                                 
17 After the 2004 merger of Fleet Bank into Bank of America, the Boston Globe 
(2004) reports that the merged company did not take up much of the housing 
promises originally made by Fleet. .  
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price restrictions prevent supply and demand from equilibrating, 
creating shortages or surpluses. Because of various price 
restrictions and regulations insurers have simply chosen not to 
underwrite large classes of goods. To fill this void, government is 
put in the odd position of either mandating private provision or 
providing financial services itself.  
 
        Both controlling private firms and creating state run 
enterprises can create perverse incentives. Oftentimes this leads to 
more government involvement (Mises, 1992). A state-sponsored 
insurance company crowds out private firms, because they now 
have a competitor that can charge less and take tremendous losses 
without going out of business. The Massachusetts state-sponsored 
Fair Plan provides insurance to people who cannot obtain the 
private variety. In Roxbury, northern Mattapan, and southwest 
Dorchester, where a higher percentage of minorities live, over 
three-quarters of the insured homes are covered by the Fair Plan. 
This compares to half a percent of all homes in Newton, a town 
with a lower percentage of minorities (Blanton, 1995). But the 
costs of government policies are often ignored. Just because 
government provides a service, it does not mean it is free to 
society. When a state enterprise‟s expenses exceed its revenue 
taxpayers, of course, end up footing the bill.  
 
          Government regulation is usually promoted as a measure to 
benefit consumers, while in actuality it can have the opposite 
effect. It is quite possible that when increased regulation raises 
costs to producers they will pass those on to consumers. What has 
been the result of the regulations and more involvement in 
Massachusetts? Have they really helped citizens against high 
insurance costs? The answer is pretty clear: "On average, 
Massachusetts drivers pay the third highest auto insurance bills in 
the country. With rates set by law every year there has been little 
  16 
opportunity for competition" (Kurkjiian, 1995b)18. With all of its 
interference in the market, government does not seem to be an 
effective tool for increasing choices for consumers. 
 
         With the different regulations being enacted there is an 
increase in unsound loans being made. This can have adverse 
consequences that end up affecting the entire mortgage market 
without its cause being completely obvious (Day and Liebowitz 
1998, Liebowitz 2008). As Day and Liebowitz (2008) also show 
they regulations are often brought on by poor and misinformation.. 
The leading reason for the anti-discrimination regulations that have 
helped cause the recent trouble was brought about by a flawed 
study by the Boston Fed in 1992.19 Evidence like this calls into 
question the different regulations.  
 
        This leads to the question of what is government's proper role 
in a market economy. Should government be providing banking 
and insurance to all comers? If the answer is yes then what makes 
the insurance industry unique? Rather than relying on what amount 
to price controls, mandatory lending schemes, and government 
provision, the government could simply remove the restrictions 
which would enable more competition. If the insurance and 
banking industries were able to operate freely20 everybody who 
could afford and wanted services could get them.21 There would be 
                                                 
18 As of 2006 Massachusetts has the 4
th
 highest auto insurance rates (Mohl 
2006). Auto deregulations, however, have started to be made (Mohl 2007). 
19 In addition to Day and Liebowitz 2008 see Harrison 1998. 
20 Nothing here should be taken to imply that the present authors believe these to 
be completely free. On the contrary, both depend on restrictions on entry and 
other illegitimate government interventions. For more on this see Rothbard 
(1983, 1994). 
21 It is even less clear why those who advocate policies to help the poor do not 
request that the poor be given cash transfers to purchase insurance. Perhaps there 
is an ulterior motive for supporting regulation (Stigler, 1971).  
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no shortages and no need for state provided services. With fewer 
restrictions the quality of services available would also increase.  
Competition forces banks and insurers to be driven not by 
considerations of discrimination but by the promises of profits.  
 
Like any other industry, anyone who‟s willing to pay for a 
good would be able to obtain what they want. Should we allow 
companies to charge more and allow people to pay more if that is 
what both parties prefer? Higher insurance rates and higher loan 
rejection rates all occur because of higher inner city costs and 
higher default risks. As we have seen, discrimination does not 
cause the higher prices; it is, rather, higher costs. In an unregulated 
market, would there be equal insurance rates and bank loans to all 
people? Any differences among groups, just as differences among 
individuals, would be reflected in market phenomena.  
 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
Insurance companies and banks are often accused of engaging in 
racial discrimination. Even if it were true in many individual cases, 
as long as there is competition the problem will not persist at the 
aggregate level. Racial discrimination comes at a cost to those who 
engage in it, but luckily most banks and insurance companies are 
profit driven. Any examples of racial discrimination create profit 
opportunities for those who do not engage in racial discrimination. 
The higher the profit opportunities the more companies will seek to 
replicate that behavior; which means in the long run, extra normal 
profit opportunities cannot persist. Therefore, if there is any 
difference in coverage or in rates it must be due to some other 
factor such as costs or risk.  
 
Real world banking and insurance markets may not operate 
exactly like the textbook model of perfect competition, but that 
does not mean that the non-profitable strategy racial discrimination 
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will persist. Even if the market is not perfectly competitive, the 
solution should be to allow as much competition as possible 
because the more competition the less likely discrimination is to 
take place. Markets may not be perfect, but they still might the best 
way of dealing with the potential problem of racial discrimination 
because government policies have unintended consequences and 
often end up hurting the very people it sets out to help.  
Competition, in contrast, provides incentives for banks and 
insurance companies to not engage in racial discrimination since 
doing so involves a cost. Rather than considering regulation as the 
solution, policymakers should look towards deregulation since 
competition has built in incentives to mitigate if not eliminate 
harmful cases of racial discrimination. Unfortunately in the current 
world, government policies have only exacerbated problems and 
made it more difficult for city residents to purchase the financial 
services they demand.  
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